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Abstract
We analyze the design of optimal international environmental a-
greement (IEA) by a three-stage coalition formation game. A certain
degree of participation uncertainty exists in that each country choos-
ing to sign the IEA for its best interest has a probability to make a
mistake and end up a non-signatory. The IEA rule, which specifies the
action of each signatory for each coalition formed, is endogenously de-
termined by a designer, whose goal is to maximize the expected payoff
of each signatory. We provide an algorithm to determine an optimal
rule and compare this rule to some popular rules used in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The human society is facing a serious threat of climate change, mainly due
to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). For a country, reducing the e-
mission of GHG can be regarded as providing a public good benefiting the
whole world. However, voluntary abatement of GHG is typically not suffi-
cient, because every country has an incentive to free ride on the abatement
effort of other countries. One method to overcome this free-riding problem
is to form a coalition wherein the members sign a self-enforcing internation-
al environmental agreement (IEA) and follow certain abatement rules. The
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are examples of such IEAs.
The formation of these coalitions is sometimes modeled as a two-stage
game, or its variant, played by some self-interested countries.1 In stage one
(participation stage), each country decides whether to join the coalition and
sign the IEA. In stage two (abatement stage), those signing the IEA have to
follow the IEA rule, while each non-signatory can decide its own abatement
level.
Nevertheless, it is reported that IEAs do not work very well. For instance,
Kellenberg and Levinson (2014) suggest that “IEAs appear to do little more
than ratify what countries would have done absent the agreements.” There
could be many reasons for the failure of IEAs, but in this paper, we focus
only on the following two of them.
First, the IEA rule is typically exogenously given and may not provide
for much incentive to overcome the free-riding problem. For instance, a large
body of studies assume that in stage two of the game, all coalition members
should coordinate their actions and maximize the total payoffs of the coalition
formed in stage one. We call this IEA rule the maximal total payoff (MTP)
rule. In section 5, we will show that the MTP rule is generally not optimal.
In order to overcome the problem raised by exogenous IEA rules, several
studies analyzed the endogenous determination of the IEA rules. For exam-
ple, Carraro et al. (2009) discuss the MTP rule with an additional restriction
1For example, see Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Thoron (1998), Finus
(2001), Masoudi and Zaccour (2017).
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of minimal participation; here, the threshold of forming the coalition is en-
dogenously determined. Ko¨ke and Lange (2017) considers an endogenous
rule that simultaneously determine the threshold of cooperation and the sig-
natories’ abatement level. However, these studies analyze only certain special
cases of endogenous rules and hence cannot be considered fully general. In
particular, a signatory’s abatement level as specified by these rules need not
vary endogenously according to the coalition formed in stage one, except
when the change involves the minimal participation condition.
The second reason for the IEAs’ failure is participation uncertainty: a
country initially intending to sign the IEA for its own interest has a chance
to make a mistake and end up a non-signatory. This uncertainty, which makes
it more difficult to form a large coalition, may be due to various reasons under
different cases. For example, ratification of the IEA may be prevented by
some interest groups2, or a newly elected leader may overturn the decision
made by his predecessor. In contrast, we assume that the probability that
a country not intending to sign the IEA becomes a signatory, which rarely
happens in reality, is zero. Also note that participation uncertainty is unlike
several other types of risk and uncertainty discussed in the IEA literature.3
The main purpose of this study is to extend the traditional coalition
formation models of IEA to allow for participation uncertainty and fully
general rules that are endogenously determined. We hope these extensions
will help us design a better IEA rule than the ones used in reality and those
in the literature. To this end, we employ a three-stage coalition formation
game. In stage one (designing stage), a designer4 launches an coalition and
announces an IEA rule, which is a function specifies the abatement level of
a signatory (coalition member) for each possible coalition formed in stage
two of the game. As the initiator of the coalition, the designer’s goal is to
maximize the expected payoff of each signatory. Stage two extends the usual
participation stage by assuming a given probability ε ≥ 0 that each country
choosing to sign the IEA would finally end up not being a coalition member.
2See Ko¨ke and Lange (2017).
3See, among others, Kolstad (2007), Dellink et al. (2008), Kuiper and Olaizola (2008),
Hong and Karp (2014), Cazals and Sauquet (2015), and Masoudi et al. (2016).
4For example, the United Nations.
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Stage three is the usual abatement stage that determines each country’s
abatement level and payoff.
This three-stage game can be solved by backward induction. Thus, we
determine the optimal rule that the designer would announce in stage one
and the coalition of countries that intend to sign the IEA in stage two. Note
that participation uncertainty would make it more difficult to determine the
coalition that will form in stage two. Given the IEA rule announced in stage
one, a coalition will be formed if and only if it is stable; that is, no country
would change its participation decision both before and after observing the
mistakes made by some other countries. We prove that given any IEA rule,
the cardinality of a stable coalition can be uniquely determined (Proposition
1). Furthermore, we provide an algorithm to determine an optimal rule for
the designer (Theorem 1).
Some IEA rules, for example, the MTP rule, the minimal participation
rule, and the coalition unanimity rule, are commonly used in the literature.
We show through an example that these rules are generally not optimal for
the designer. Additionally, we briefly discuss the conditions under which
these rules are optimal (Proposition 2, 3).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the setup of the model and the three-stage coalition formation game. We
solve this game and derive an optimal IEA rule in section 3 and 4. Some
traditional IEA rules are discussed and compared with the optimal rule in
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of homogeneous countries, where n ≥ 2.
There is a perfectly divisible good with negative externalities, for example,
greenhouse gas. Furthermore, let xi denote country i’s abatement level of
the good and x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an abatement combination.
4
Given x, country i’s payoff is
ui(x) = α
∑
j∈N
xj − 1
2
x2i , (1)
where α > 0 is the constant marginal benefit from total abatement
∑
j∈N xj
due to negative externalities of the good, and x2i /2 is country i’s abatement
cost. Assume that payoffs are transferable, and therefore social welfare is the
total payoffs of all countries:
U(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(x) = nα
∑
i∈N
xi −
∑
i∈N
x2i
2
.
An abatement combination (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is said to be socially optimal if it
maximizes social welfare. The first-order conditions ∂U(x)/∂xi = 0 yield
x∗i = nα, ∀i ∈ N. (2)
On the other hand, if each country i chooses xi to maximize its own pay-
off ui given the other countries’ abatement levels, the first-order conditions
∂ui(x)/∂xi = 0 lead to
x¯i = α, ∀i ∈ N. (3)
Note that x¯i is a dominant abatement level of i, regardless of other coun-
tries’ actions. From this, it follows that x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of this non-cooperative abatement game.
Since x∗i > x¯i, the world suffers from too much emission of the good.
This is a commonly known social dilemma due to externalities. One possible
method to partially overcome this problem is to form a coalition that reg-
ulates the countries’ actions by a self-enforcing IEA. The formation of the
coalition follows a three-stage game.
• Stage one. A designer announces an IEA rule e, which is a function
assigning a real value e(m) ≥ 0 to each integer m ∈ [1, n], where m is
the cardinality of the coalition M that will be formed in stage two. A
rule can be denoted by the vector e =
(
e(1), . . . , e(n)
) ∈ Rn+.
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• Stage two. All countries in N simultaneously decide whether or not
to sign the IEA. Let M denote the set of countries that choose to
sign and m = |M | denote its cardinality. However, there is a one-way
uncertainty with regard to each country’s final participation decision.
Specifically, each country i ∈M has a probability ε of making a mistake
and failing to sign the IEA, where 0 ≤ ε < 1 is exogenously given.
However, each j /∈ M never makes a mistake and would certainly not
sign the IEA. Let M denote the set of signatory countries that choose to
sign the IEA and make no mistake, and m = |M | denote its cardinality.
Given m and ε ∈ (0, 1), m follows a binomial distribution so that the
probability that m = k is
b(k;m, 1− ε) = m!
k!(m− k)!ε
m−k(1− ε)k, ∀k = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
Additionally, if ε = 0, then b(m;m, 1) = 1, b(k;m, 1) = 0, ∀k < m.
• Stage three. Given rule e and the coalition M , each signatory i ∈ M
carries out its abatement xi = e(m) according to e, while each non-
signatory j /∈ M chooses its dominant abatement level xj = α. All
countries receive their respective payoffs according to (1).
Now, let G(n, α, ε) denote this three-stage game. Assume that each coun-
try is risk neutral and chooses its action to maximize its expected payoff. We
also assume that a country will choose to sign the IEA if it is indifferent be-
tween signing and not signing. The designer will choose e ∈ Rn+ to maximize
the (identical) expected value of the payoff of each signatory i ∈M .
3 Stable coalition and equilibrium scale
We solve game G(n, α, ε) by backward induction. Consider stage three first.
Given e and m, let
X(m, e) = me(m) + (n−m)α
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denote the total abatement of all countries. Now, a signatory’s payoff is
uC(m, e) = αX(m, e)− e(m)
2
2
, if m ≥ 1. (4)
Additionally, let
uC(0, e) = ui(x¯) = (n− 1/2)α2. (5)
A non-signatory’s payoff is
uI(m, e) = αX(m, e)− α
2
2
, if m < n.
In stage two of G(n, α, ε), given e and m−i = |M\{i}|, country i’s ex-
pected payoff is
uC(m−i + 1, e) =
m−i∑
k=0
b(k;m−i, 1− ε)
[
εuI(k, e) + (1− ε)uC(k + 1, e)]
if i chooses to sign the IEA (i ∈M), and it is
uI(m−i, e) =
m−i∑
k=0
b(k;m−i, 1− ε)uI(k, e)
if i chooses not to sign (i /∈ M). In other words, uC(m, e) and uI(m, e) are
the expected payoffs of a country that chooses to sign and not to sign the
IEA, respectively, when exactly m countries choose to sign the IEA.
We use the concept of stable coalition to predict which countries choose
to sign the IEA in stage two. Roughly speaking, a coalition M is stable if the
countries in the coalition are the only ones choosing to sign the IEA before
any mistake occurs (ex ante stable), and countries that do not make mistakes
will not change their decisions after some other countries have made mistakes
(ex post stable).
Formally, following d’Aspremont et al. (1983) and many others, coalition
M is said to be ex ante stable relative to e if no country i ∈ M is willing
to unilaterally leave M and no country j /∈ M is willing to unilaterally join
M before uncertainty is realized. Hence, a coalition M /∈ {∅, N} is ex ante
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stable relative to e if
uC(m, e) ≥ uI(m− 1, e), uC(m+ 1, e) < uI(m, e).
In addition, M = ∅ is ex ante stable relative to e if uC(1, e) < uI(0, e), while
M = N is ex ante stable relative to e if uC(n, e) ≥ uI(n− 1, e).
A coalition M 6= ∅ is said to be ex post stable relative to e if no signatory
will regret its decision to sign the IEA and withdraw after uncertainty is
realized, no matter how many countries in M have made mistakes; that is,
uC(k + 1, e) ≥ uI(k, e), ∀k ∈ [0,m− 1].
In addition, M = ∅ is trivially ex post stable relative to any e ∈ Rn+.
Finally, M is said to be stable relative to e if it is both ex ante stable
relative to e and ex post stable relative to e. Ultimately, a stable coalition
will not provide any incentive for any country to change its decision regarding
participation under any circumstance. Consequently,
(a) M = ∅ is stable relative to e if
uC(1, e) < uI(0, e); (6)
(b) M /∈ {∅, N} is stable relative to e if
uC(m+ 1, e) < uI(m, e), uC(k + 1, e) ≥ uI(k, e), ∀k ∈ [0,m− 1]; (7)
(c) M = N is stable relative to e if
uC(k + 1, e) ≥ uI(k, e), ∀k ∈ [0, n− 1]. (8)
Because of the symmetry of countries, whether a coalition M is stable
relative to rule e depends only on m = |M |. If a coalition M is stable
relative to e, then we say that m is an equilibrium scale relative to e.
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium scale relative to any given rule. Let m(e) denote this unique
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equilibrium scale relative to e. In other words, if the designer announces rule
e in stage one, then in stage two there will be m(e) countries choosing to sign
the IEA. In the proof of this proposition, we provide an algorithm to derive
m(e) for each e ∈ Rn+.
Proposition 1. There is a unique equilibrium scale relative to each e ∈ Rn+.
Proof. First, we prove that there exists at most one equilibrium scale relative
to any e. Assume for a contradiction that both m1 and m2 are equilibrium
scales relative to some e, where m1 < m2. Since m1 is an equilibrium scale,
we have uC(m1 + 1, e) < u
I(m1, e), which contradicts the assumption that
m2 is also an equilibrium scale.
If uC(1, e) < uI(0, e), then m(e) = 0; otherwise, we have uC(1, e) ≥
uI(0, e). Furthermore, if uC(2, e) < uI(1, e), then m(e) = 1; otherwise, we
have uC(1, e) ≥ uI(0, e), uC(2, e) ≥ uI(1, e). Proceeding in this manner, we
shall either find an equilibrium scale m(e) < n, or eventually have uC(k, e) ≥
uI(k − 1, e), k = 1, 2, . . . , n, which implies that m(e) = n.
Given e ∈ Rn+, let EuC(e) denote the expected payoff of a signatory. Since
there are m(e) countries intending to sign the IEA, the probability that there
are exactly k signatories is b
(
k;m(e), 1− ε) for all k ≤ m(e). Thus, we have
EuC(e) =
m(e)∑
k=0
b
(
k;m(e), 1− ε)uC(k, e). (9)
It follows from (5) that that when no country signs the IEA, the designer
will take a non-signatory’s payoff as a substitute for a signatory’s payoff; we
make this trivial assumption only to ensure that the objective of the designer
is always well-defined.
4 An optimal rule
Now, consider stage one of G(n, α, ε). The objective of the designer in this
stage is to maximize EuC(e) by choosing an appropriate rule e. If a rule e
exists such that EuC(e) ≥ EuC(e′) for all e′ ∈ Rn+, then we say that e is
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optimal. The following theorem shows that there always exists an optimal
rule. The proof explicitly demonstrates how to construct an optimal rule.
Theorem 1. For any game G(n, α, ε), there exists an optimal rule e∗.
Proof. For each integer s ∈ [0, n], let E(s) = {e ∈ Rn+ |m(e) = s} be the set
of rules whose equilibrium scale is s. Additionally, for each s ∈ [1, n], define
E(s) =
{(
e(1), . . . , e(s)
) ∈ Rs+ |uC(k+1, e) ≥ uI(k, e), ∀k ∈ [0, s−1]}. (10)
Now, it is obvious that, if e =
(
e(1), . . . , e(n)
) ∈ E(s), then (e(1), . . . , e(s)) ∈
E(s). The proof of the following lemma is in the appendix.
Lemma 1. For each s ∈ [1, n], E(s) is a non-empty bounded closed set.
If m(e) = 0, then from (6), we have e(1) 6= α. Therefore, EuC(e) =
(n− 1
2
)α2 for all e ∈ E(0) = {e ∈ Rn+ | e(1) 6= α}.
If m(e) = 1, then from (7), we can easily obtain E(1) = {e ∈ Rn+ | e(1) =
α, e(2) ∈ (−∞, α) ∪ (3α,∞)}, EuC(e) = εuC(0, e) + (1− ε)uC(1, e) = (n −
1
2
)α2 for all e ∈ E(1).
If m(e) = 2, then again from (7), we have E(2) = {e ∈ Rn+ | e(1) =
α, e(2) ∈ [α, 3α], e(3) ∈ (−∞, f1(e(2)))∪ (f2(e(2)),∞)}, where f1 and f2 are
two functions that can be easily determined, but are irrelevant to our analysis.
When e ∈ E(2), EuC(e) = ε2uC(0, e) + 2ε(1 − ε)uC(1, e) + (1 − ε)2uC(2, e)
depends only on e(1) and e(2). Therefore, we have maxe∈E(2)EuC(e) =
max(e(1),e(2))∈E(2)Eu
C(e). Similarly, for s ∈ [2, n], we have
max
e∈E(s)
EuC(e) = max
(e(1),...,e(s))∈E(s)
EuC(e).
Now, for any s ∈ [1, n], there exists e∗s =
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(n)
) ∈ E(s)
such that EuC(e∗s) ≥ EuC(e′) for all e′ ∈ E(s). That is, EuC(e∗s) =
maxe∈E(s)EuC(e). In fact, from Lemma 1, we can derive
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
)
by solving the constrained optimization problem max(e(1),...,e(s))∈E(s)Eu
C(e),5
and
(
e∗s(s+1), . . . , e
∗
s(n)
)
can be any vector as long as uC(s+1, e∗s) < u
I(s, e∗s).
5Apply the Kuhn–Tucker theorem.
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Finally, the maximal value of EuC(e) equals max1≤s≤n maxe∈E(s)EuC(e).
An optimal rule e∗ can thus be found, where
EuC(e∗) = max
1≤s≤n
{EuC(e∗1), EuC(e∗2), . . . , EuC(e∗n)}.
This ends the proof of the proposition.
As an example, consider game G(5, 2, 0.1). In Table 1, we list for each
s ∈ [1, 5] the value of EuC(e∗s), which is the maximal value of EuC(e) under
the condition m(e) = s, as well as the corresponding rules
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
)
.
Since EuC(e∗5) > Eu
C(e∗4) > Eu
C(e∗3) > Eu
C(e∗2) > Eu
C(e∗1), we have e
∗ =
e∗5 = (2, 2, 3.61, 6.44, 10), and Eu
C(e∗) = 42.78.
Table 1: Calculating optimal rule e∗ for G(5, 2, 0.1)
s
(
e∗s(1), . . . , e
∗
s(s)
)
EuC(e∗s)
1 (2) 18
2 (2, 4) 19.62
3 (2, 4, 6) 24.32
4 (2, 2.95, 5.23, 8) 32.13
5 (2, 2, 3.61, 6.44, 10) 42.78
5 Discussion
Now, we discuss some special rules commonly used in the literature and
compare them to the optimal rule e∗.
(a) A rule ea is called the MTP rule if it always aims to maximize the
total payoffs of all signatories. Because of the symmetry of players,
we have m · uC(m, ea) ≥ m · uC(m, e′), or uC(m, ea) ≥ uC(m, e′), for
all m ∈ [1, n] and e′ ∈ Rn+. That is, for all m ∈ [1, n], ea maximizes
uC(m, e), and thus ea(m) = αm.
(b) A rule eb is called a minimal participation rule6 if there existsm∗ ∈ [2, n]
such that eb(m) = α when 1 ≤ m < m∗, and eb(m) = q > α when
6See Ko¨ke and Lange (2017).
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m ≥ m∗. In other words, this rule requires an abatement level q for
signatories when at least m∗ countries sign the IEA. In particular, if
m∗ = n, eb is called the coalition unanimity rule7.
(c) A rule ec is called an MTP rule with minimal participation8 if there
exists m∗ ∈ [2, n] such that ec(m) = α for all 1 ≤ m < m∗, and
ec(m) = αm for all m ≥ m∗. Hence, ec is a combination of ea and eb.
To compare these rules, we reconsider the example in the previous section
where n = 5, α = 2. First, the MTP rule ea satisfies ea(m) = 2m for all
m ∈ [1, n]. Next, consider a coalition unanimity rule eb where eb(m) = 2
when m < 5 and eb(5) = 10. Finally, consider an MTP rule with minimal
participation ec where ec(4) = 8, ec(5) = 10, and ec(m) = 2 when m < 4.
For these rules and the optimal rule e∗, we list the corresponding m(e) and
EuC(e) for some particular value of ε in Table 2.9 We shall explain and
discuss the data in this table.
Table 2: Simulation for G(5, 2, ε)
ea eb ec e∗
ε m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e) m(e) EuC(e)
0 3 26 5 50 4 36 5 50
0.1 3 24.32 5 36.90 4 29.81 5 42.78
0.2 3 22.86 5 28.49 5 35.86 5 36.88
0.3 3 21.63 5 23.38 5 29.86 5 32.02
0.4 3 20.59 5 20.49 5 25.15 5 28.03
0.5 4 21.88 5 19 5 21.81 5 24.79
0.6 4 20.38 5 18.33 5 19.71 5 22.22
0.7 5 20.26 5 18.08 5 18.59 5 20.26
0.8 5 18.94 5 18.01 5 18.13 5 18.94
0.9 5 18.22 5 18.00 5 18.01 5 18.22
For the designer, a rule e has two important aspects that may affect the
value of his objective EuC(e). On the one hand, the designer may wish
7See Chander and Tulkens (1997).
8See Carraro et al. (2009).
9For each ε in the table, the maximal value of EuC(e), where e ∈ {ea, eb, ec}, is
highlighted in bold to show which of the three rules is best for the designer.
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more countries to sign the IEA and that the signatories engage in a high
abatement level. Thus, the rule should provide for a strong incentive for
cooperation or strong punishment for free riding by creating a large payoff gap
between signing and not signing. On the other hand, the designer may also
wish to reduce the harm that uncertainty brings on the expected payoffs of
signatories. This can be accomplished only by designing a rule by which even
when some countries do not sign the IEA due to mistakes, other signatories
can still maintain a relatively high level of abatement, leading to a small
payoff gap between signing and not signing.
We call these two aspects of the rules as incentive effect and uncertainty
effect respectively. A rule has a strong/weak incentive effect if it provides
strong/weak incentives for countries to sign the IEA; a rule has a strong/weak
uncertainty effect if a certain ε has a small/large impact on EuC(e).
The incentive effect and uncertainty effect are typically contradictory. For
example, a rule with a strong uncertainty effect usually has a weak incentive
effect. This is because any factor of the rule protecting the signatories from
harm caused by uncertainty will require those signatories to maintain a high
level of abatement regardless of the other countries’ mistakes. However, this
requirement would also reduce the incentive for cooperation. An appropriate
rule should have a good balance between the two conflicting effects.
From Table 2, of the three special rules we discussed above, the coalition
unanimity rule eb is optimal when ε = 0. This is because eb obviously has
a strong incentive effect and weak uncertainty effect, but the latter is irrel-
evant when ε = 0. Moreover, the next proposition shows that the coalition
unanimity rule is almost optimal when uncertainty is sufficiently small.
Proposition 2. Suppose eb(n) = αn, and eb(m) = α for all m < n. For any
µ > 0, there exists γ > 0 such that if ε < γ, EuC(eb) > EuC(e′)− µ, for all
e′ ∈ Rn+.
Proof. It is obvious that m(eb) = n. Given any µ > 0, when ε is sufficiently
small, EuC(eb) =
∑n
k=0 b
(
k;n, 1 − ε)uC(k, eb) can be arbitrarily close to
uC(n, eb), and thus EuC(eb) > uC(n, eb) − µ. From (4), it is easy to verify
that uC(n, eb) ≥ uC(m, e′) for all m ≤ n and all e′ ∈ Rn+. Hence, EuC(eb) >
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uC(n, eb) − µ ≥ ∑m(e′)k=0 b(k;m(e′), 1 − ε)uC(k, e′) − µ = EuC(e′) − µ, for all
e′ ∈ Rn+.
In contrast, from Table 2, the MTP rule ea is an optimal rule only when
ε is large enough. This turns out to be a general outcome according to the
next proposition, which suggests that the MTP rule has a relatively strong
uncertainty effect.
Proposition 3. There exists θ > 0 such that if ε > θ, ea is optimal.
Proof. See the appendix.
Consider game G(5, 2, ε) again and suppose that one country deviates
from the grand coalition M = N because of a mistake. This deviation will
cause each remaining signatory to reduce its abatement level by e(5)− e(4),
which is ea(5)−ea(4) = 2 under the MTP rule, and is eb(5)−eb(4) = 8 under
the coalition unanimity rule. This example illustrates why the MTP rule has
a stronger uncertainty effect than the coalition unanimity rule.
The fact that the MTP rule may not be optimal under a small uncertainty
seems to be counterintuitive at first glance. Once a coalition is formed, it
is quite natural to require all signatories to act as one player and maximize
their total payoffs. This explains why the MTP rule is so popular in the
coalition formation literature. However, a shortcoming of the MTP rule is
that it has a weak incentive effect and hence cannot effectively overcome the
free-riding problem. Indeed, when ε is sufficiently small, the designer should
require the maximization of total payoffs of coalition members for only a
stable coalition, rather than for all coalitions. These redundant requirements
lead to a weak incentive effect and undermine the MTP rule.
Finally, from Table 2, the MTP rule with minimal participation ec can
be regarded as a mixture of ea and eb. Hence, for the designer, ec is better
than ea and eb when ε is neither too large nor too small.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this study, we introduce a three-stage coalition formation game to analyze
the endogenous determination of the IEA rule under participation uncer-
tainty. We provide an algorithm to derive an optimal rule, which reaches an
appropriate balance between providing sufficient incentive for cooperation
and reducing the losses caused by participation uncertainty.
We find that some commonly used rules are generally not optimal. In
particular, the MTP rule has a weak incentive effect and is not optimal
unless the uncertainty is very large; while the coalition unanimity rule has
a weak uncertainty effect, it is optimal only when there is no participation
uncertainty. Some of the failures of the IEAs in reality or in theory can be
attributed to the inappropriate rules used under certain situations.
Some further works and extensions may be worth studying in future re-
search. First, an open question is whether optimal rules are always (ex
ante) efficient in the sense that they result in full participation and induce
enough abatement level before uncertainty is realized; that is, m(e∗) = n and
e∗(n) = nα. This question is important, because if the answer is positive,
then we can be fairly optimistic about what IEAs may accomplish as long as
their rules are properly designed. However, by now the author can neither
prove the statement nor find an counterexample.
Second, we can study models with more general settings, for example,
models with heterogeneous countries, or models with more general payoff
function. Third, we may consider more complex IEA rules. For example, a
rule may contain an emission function ei(M) specifying the abatement level
of i ∈M and a transfer function ti(M) characterizing the amount of money
transferred to country i when coalition M is formed. Last but not least,
some other goals of the designer can be studied. For instance, sometimes it
makes more sense to assume that the designer will maximize expected social
welfare rather than the signatories’ welfare.
Finally, note that in addition to the IEA issue, the MTP rule is widely
applied in some other areas involving the voluntary provision of goods with
externalities, such as cartel formation in oligopoly markets, cooperation in
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R&D, and sharing natural resource.10 In a typical application, players first
decide whether to join a coalition, and then all coalition members act ac-
cording to the MTP rule. However, in most of these works, participation
uncertainty is implicitly assumed to be zero, which implies that the MTP
rule may not be an optimal rule for coalition members and the designer.
Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to re-examine the outcome of these
works by endogenizing the choice of the coalition rules.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
(a) From (10), E(s) is obviously a closed set in Rs+ for each s ∈ [1, n].
(b) Now, we prove that E(s) is a bounded set in Rs+ by induction on s. We
can easily see that E(1) = {α} is bounded in R1+. Assume inductively that
E(k) is bounded in Rk+, 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1. That is, there exist T1, T2, . . . , Tk > 0,
such that for each
(
e(1), . . . , e(k)
) ∈ E(k): e(q) < Tq, 1 ≤ q ≤ k.
Now, consider E(k+1). According to (10), for each
(
e(1), . . . , e(k+1)
) ∈
E(k + 1), we have e(q) < Tq, 1 ≤ q ≤ k. Additionally, e(k + 1) satisfies
uC(k + 1, e) ≥ uI(k, e); that is,
−1
2
e(k + 1)2 + a(k + 1)e(k + 1) + A(k) > 0,
where A(k) depends on
(
e(1), . . . , e(k)
)
. Thus, e(k + 1) is also bounded,
implying that E(k + 1) is bounded in Rk+1+ . Consequently, E(s) is bounded
in Rs+ for each s ∈ [1, n].
(c) It remains to be proved that E(s) is not empty. Given s ∈ [1, n], we
can construct
(
eˆ(1), . . . , eˆ(s)
)
as follows:
(n1) eˆ(s) = αs.
(n2) eˆ(k) = α, 1 ≤ k ≤ s− 1.
10See, for example, d’Aspremont et al. (1983), Katz (1986), Poyago-Theotoky (1995),
Ray and Vohra (2001), Miller and Nkuiya (2016).
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For any m < n and any rule e, we have
uC(m+ 1, e)− uI(m, e)
=(1− ε)
m∑
k=0
b(k;m, 1− ε) [uC(k + 1, e)− uI(k, e)] . (11)
Note that from (n2), uC(k + 1, eˆ) − uI(k, eˆ) = 0, k ∈ [1, s − 2]; from (n1)
and (n2), uC(s, eˆ) − uI(s − 1, eˆ) = 1
2
α2(s − 1)2 ≥ 0. Hence, from (11),
uC(m + 1, eˆ) ≥ uI(m, eˆ), m ∈ [0, s − 1]. Therefore, (eˆ(1), . . . , eˆ(s)) ∈ E(s),
implying E(s) 6= ∅.
Proof of Proposition 3.
From the definition of ea, we can easily verify that
uC(m, ea)−uI(m− 1, ea) = −1
2
α2(m− 1)(m− 3) =

= 0, if m = 1, 3
> 0, if m = 2
< 0, if 3 < m ≤ n
.
Further, from (11), when ε is sufficiently large, uC(m+ 1, ea)−uI(m, ea) ≥ 0
for all m ∈ [0, n− 1], implying that m(ea) = n.
When ε is very large, we have b
(
0;n, 1 − ε)  b(1;n, 1 − ε)  · · · 
b
(
n;n, 1−ε). According to (9), a necessary condition for rule e0 to be optimal
is that e0(1) maximizes uC(1, e); that is, e0(1) = α, since otherwise we can
find e′ such that uC(1, e′) > uC(1, e0), and hence uC(1, e′) > uC(1, e0), which
implies that EuC(e′) > EuC(e0) for a sufficiently large ε.
Now, assume that e0(k) maximizes uC(k, e) for all k ∈ [1,m], where
m < n. If e0 is optimal for a sufficiently large ε, e0(k + 1) also maximizes
uC(k + 1, e), since otherwise let e′ be such that e′(s) = e0(s), s ≤ k, and
uC(k + 1, e′) > uC(k + 1, e0), implying that uC(k + 1, e′) > uC(k + 1, e0) and
EuC(e′) > EuC(e0), which contradicts the assumption that e0 is optimal.
Thus, we have proved that if e0 is optimal when ε is large enough, then
e0(k) maximizes uC(k, e) for all k ∈ [1, n], which implies that e0 = ea. That
is, ea is optimal when ε is sufficiently large.
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